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Abstract
We introduce a class of extensive form games where players might not be able to foresee
the possible consequences of their decisions and form a model of their opponents which
they exploit to achieve a more profitable outcome. We improve upon existing models of
games with limited foresight, endowing players with the ability of higher-order reasoning
and proposing a novel solution concept to address intuitions coming from real game play.
We analyse the resulting equilibria, devising an effective procedure to compute them.
1 Introduction
While game theory is a predominant paradigm in Artificial Intelligence, the tools it provides
to analyse real game play still abstract away from many essential features. One of them is the
fact that in a wide range of extensive games of perfect information (e.g., Chess), humans (and
supercomputers) are generally not able to fully assess the consequence of their own decisions
and need to resort to a judgment call before making a move. As acclaimed game theorist
Ariel Rubinstein puts it, "modeling games with limited foresight remains a great challenge"
and the game-theoretic frameworks developed thus far "fall short of capturing the spirit of
limited-foresight reasoning" (Rubinstein, 2004, p.134).
On the contrary, the AI approach to game-playing builds upon the assumption that
complex extensive games like Chess or Go are theoretically games of perfect information, but
this is only marginally relevant for practical purposes, and the backwards induction solution
is of little help in predicting how such games are actually played in practice - a point also
raised in Joseph Halpern’s AAMAS 2011 invited talk "Beyond Nash Equilibrium: Solution
Concepts for the 21st Century" (Halpern, 2008). Decisions are instead taken using heuristic
search (e.g., monte-carlo tree search) under various constraints, such as time or memory
(Russell and Wefald, 1991) (Russel and Norvig, 2012).
The problem. Search methods are a framework to handle limited foresight and are
widely used for decision-making in real game-play, but a game-theoretic analysis of their
equilibrium behaviour is still missing. In particular, we lack the tools to analyse what will
happen in complex extensive games of perfect information where players are not able to resort
to backwards induction reasoning but to possibly faulty and incomplete heuristic. What is
more, the enormous effort to construct players with "opponent modelling" in the AI community
(e.g., (Schadd et al., 2007) (Donkers et al., 2001)) still lacks solid game-theoretic foundations.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
50
2.
03
68
3v
6 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 29
 M
ay
 20
16
Our contribution. We introduce games in which players might not be able to foresee
the consequence of their strategic decisions all the way up to the terminal nodes and evaluate
intermediate nodes according to a concrete heuristic search method. On top of that they
can reason about other players’ limited foresight and evaluation criteria: they are endowed
with higher-order beliefs about what their opponents can perceive of the game and how they
evaluate it, beliefs about what their opponents believe the others can see and how the evaluate
it, and so forth. To analyse these games, we propose a new solution concept which combines
higher-order reasoning about players’ limited foresight and evaluation criteria. The guiding
principle for players’ behaviour is that each of them chooses a strategy in the game she sees
that is a best response to the belief about what the other players can see and how they evaluate
it. We show constructively (Algorithms 1-4) that this solution concept always exists (Theorem
1) and is a strict generalization of other known ones, e.g., backwards induction. As we will
observe, the unbounded chain of beliefs underlying our rationality constraints can be finitely
represented and - rather surprisingly - effectively resolved (Proposition 13).
Related literature. In recent years an innovative tradition has emerged in game theory,
aiming at capturing situations in which players are unaware of parts of the game they are
playing and might even think to be playing a different game from the real one. Halpern and
Rêgo (Halpern and Rêgo, 2006), for instance, study models of unawareness of elements of the
game played (e.g., other players). Yossi Feinberg (Feinberg, 2012) approaches similar problems
from a syntactic perspective. Simultaneously, the interplay between belief and awareness in
interactive situations is analysed in a series of papers by Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (Heifetz
et al., 2006), (Heifetz et al., 2013a), (Heifetz et al., 2013b).
It should be noted that even though all these frameworks abstractly allow to talk about
unawareness of some terminal histories in a game, none of them comes equipped with a
solution concept capturing limited foresight reasoning.
A framework that comes closest, perhaps, to this is Games with Short Sight (Grossi and
Turrini, 2012), a well-behaved collection of games with awareness, in which players of an
extensive game make choices without knowing the consequences of their actions and base
their decisions on a (possibly incorrect) evaluation of intermediate game positions.
Games with Short Sight (GSSs) have been studied in relation with a solution concept called
sight-compatible backwards induction: as players might not be able to calculate all possible
moves up to the terminal nodes, they play rationally in a local sense, executing moves that
are backwards induction moves in their own sight, therefore safely assuming their opponents
see as much of the game as they do.
However, sight-compatible backwards induction precludes any sort of opponent modelling,
as players are not allowed to have a non-trivial belief about what their opponents perceive.
Thus, the tools developed in (Grossi and Turrini, 2012) to analyse GSSs only allow players
to play approximately or inaccurately, they don’t allow players to exploit their opponents’
believed weaknesses. Besides, GSSs employ heuristics which are not grounded in practical
game-play. Essentially, players come equipped with a preference relation over all histories of
the game.
We will avoid strong rationality requirements of this kind, by introducing a significantly
higher level of complexity in players’ reasoning - notably their ability of forming an "opponent
model" - which, it turns out, still remains computationally manageable. Also players’
preference relations will not be taken as given, but derived from concrete search methods.
An important research line in AI that has similarities with our approach is interactive
POMDPs (Gmytrasiewicz and Doshi, 2005), which is able to incorporate higher-order
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epistemic notions in multi-agent decision making, with focus on learning and value/policy
iteration. These graph-like models are generally highly complex - in fact the whole approach
is known to suffer from severe complexity problems when it comes to equilibrium analysis
and approximation methods have been devised to (partially) address them (Doshi and
Gmytrasiewicz, 2009),(Sonu and Doshi, 2015). Instead, we present a full-blown game-
theoretic model of limited foresight that allows for higher-order epistemic notions and yet
keeps equilibrium computation within polynomial time.
Paper Structure. Section "Games with limited foresight" recalls useful formal notation
and definitions from the literature upon which we build and introduces the mathematical
structures we will be working on, Monte-Carlo Tree Games. Section "Rational beliefs and
limited foresight" studies the higher-order extension thereof, Epistemic Monte-Carlo Tree
Games. Specifically, we go on and define a new solution concept which takes this higher-
order dimension into account and we then show the existence of the new equilibria through an
efficient (P-TIME) algorithm. Section "Conclusion and potential developments" summarises
our findings and hints at new research avenues opening up in our framework.
2 Games with limited foresight
We start out with the definition of extensive games, on top of which we build the models of
limited foresight.
Extensive Games An extensive game form (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994) is a tuple
(N,H, t,Σi, o)
where [1] N is a finite non-empty set of players. [2] H is a non-empty prefix-closed set of
sequences, called histories, drawn from a set A of actions. A history (ak)k=1,...,K ∈ H is
called terminal history if it is infinite or if there is no aK+1 such that (ak)k=1,...,K+1 ∈ H. The
set of terminal histories is denoted Z. A history h is instead called quasi-terminal if for each
a ∈ A, if (h, a) ∈ H, then (h, a) is terminal. If h ∈ H is a prefix (resp., strict prefix) of h′ ∈ H
we write h h′ (resp., h h′). With Ah = {a ∈ A | (h, a) ∈ H} we denote the set of actions
following the history h. The restriction of H ′ ⊆ H to h ∈ H, i.e., {(h, h′) ∈ H | (h, h′) ∈ H ′}
is denoted H ′|h. [3]t : H \ Z → N is a turn function, which assigns a player to each
non-terminal history, i.e., the player who moves at that history. [4] Σi is a non-empty set
of strategies. A strategy of player i is function σi : {h ∈ H\Z | t(h) = i} → Ah, which
assigns an action in Ah to each non-terminal history for which t(h) = i. [5] o is the outcome
function. For each strategy profile σ = ∏i∈N (σi), the outcome o(σ) of Σ is the terminal
history that results when each player i follows the precepts of σi.
An extensive game is a tuple E = (G, {ui}i∈N ), where G is an extensive game form,
and ui : Z → R is a utility function for each player i, mapping terminal histories to reals.
We denote i⊆ Z × Z the induced total preorder over Z and BI(E) the set of backwards
induction histories of extensive game E , computed with the standard procedure (Osborne and
Rubinstein, 1994, Proposition 99.2).
Sight Functions and Forked Extensions On top of the extensive game structure, each
player moving at the certain point in the game is endowed with a set of histories that he or
she can see from then on.
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Consider an extensive game E = (G, {ui}i∈N ). A (short) sight function for E (Grossi
and Turrini, 2012) is a function
s : H\Z → 2H\∅
associating to each non-terminal history h a finite non-empty and prefix-closed subset of all
the histories extending h, i.e., histories of the form (h, h′). We denote Hdh= s(h) the sight
restriction on H induced by s at h, i.e., the set of histories in player t(h)’s sight, and Zdh
their terminal ones. Intuitively, the sight function associates any choice point with those
histories that the player playing at that choice point actively explores.
In (Grossi and Turrini, 2012) the problem of evaluating intermediate positions is resolved
by assuming the existence of an arbitrary preference relation over these nodes, which is
common knowledge among the players. What we do instead is to introduce an extension
of sight functions that models the evaluation obtained by a concrete search procedure. The
idea is that in order to evaluate intermediate positions, each player carries out a selection
and a random exploration of their continuations, all the way up to the terminal nodes. The
information obtained is used as an estimate of the value of those positions. This is an encoding
of a basic Monte-Carlo Tree Search (Browne et al., 2012).
Let (E , s) be a tuple made by an extensive game E and a sight function s. Sight function
s∗ is called a forked extension of sight function s if the following holds:
• s(h) ⊆ s∗(h) i.e., the forked extension prolongs histories in the sight it extends;
• For d∗ being the sight restriction calculated using s∗ as sight function, we have that: if
h ∈ s∗(h)\Z then there exists h′ ∈ s∗(h) such that hh′, i.e., s∗(h) is made of histories
that go all the way up to the terminal nodes. 1
A Monte-Carlo Tree Game (MTG) is a tuple S = (E , s, s∗) where E = (G, {ui}i∈N )
is an extensive game, s a sight function for E and s∗ a forked extension of s. We denote
Sdh= (Gdh, {uidh}i∈N ) the sight restriction of S induced by s at h, where Gdh is the game
form G restricted to Hdh and the utility function udh : N×Zdh → R is constructed as follows.
For each i ∈ N, g ∈ Zdh, we have:
uidh(g) = avg
z∈Zd∗
h
,gz
ui(z)
So the utility function at terminal histories in a sight is computed by taking the average2
of the histories contained in its forked extension. Notice the following important point:
histories in the forked extension are truly treated as "random" explorations, with no rationality
assumptions whatsoever, in order to construct a preference relation over Zdh. Sight-restriction
is applied to players, turn function, strategies and outcome function in the obvious way.
Summing up, each structure (Gdh, {uidh}i∈N ) is an extensive game, intuitively the part of the
game that the player moving at h is able to see, where the terminal histories are evaluated
with a monte-carlo heuristic.
1A further natural constraint on forked sight functions is that of monotonicity, i.e., players do not forget
what they have calculated in the past. Formally s is monotonic if, for each h, h′ such that t(h) = t(h′) and
h h′, we have that s∗(h)|h′ ⊆ s∗(h′). Albeit natural, this assumption is not needed to prove our results.
2Averaging has the sole purpose of simplifying notation and analysis, which carries over to any aggregator,
with or without lotteries. Besides, it comes along with a few desirable properties, notably the fact that forked
extensions never miss dominated continuations, i.e., moves that ensure a gain no matter what the opponents
do. For quantified restrictions on aggregators cfr. for instance (van Benthem et al., 2011).
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The solution concept proposed in (Grossi and Turrini, 2012) to analyse GSSs is sight-
compatible backwards induction: a choice of strategy, one per player, that is consistent with
the subgame perfect equilibrium of each sight-restricted game. We can encode it as follows.
Definition 1 (Sight-compatible BI) Let S be a MTG. A strategy profile σ is a sight-
compatible backwards induction if at each h ∈ H, there exists a terminal history z ∈ Zdh
such that hσ(h)  z and z ∈ BI(Sdh). The set of sight-compatible backwards induction
outcomes of S is denoted SCBI(S) ⊆ Z.
Thus, a sight compatible backwards induction is a strategy profile σ that, at each history h,
recommends an action a that is among the actions initiating a backwards induction history
within the sight of the player moving at h. This, notice, is different from the backwards
induction solution of the whole game, because players evaluation of intermediate nodes might
not be a correct assessment of the real outcomes of the game. Grossi and Turrini show that
the SCBI solution always exists, even in infinite games.
Despite their effort in modelling more procedural aspects of game play, though, GSSs still
lack non-trivial opponent modelling, i.e., players allowing for their opponents to “miss” future
game developments and evaluate game positions differently (or any higher-order iteration of
this belief), while adjusting their behaviour accordingly.
The rest of the paper is devoted to extending MTGs with more realistic but highly more
complex reasoning patterns, generalising both GSSs and SCBI. This, it turns out, does not
prevent us from having appropriate well-behaved solution concepts which generalise classical
ones, such as backwards induction.
3 Rational beliefs and limited foresight
We now introduce an extension of MTGs, where players are allowed for the possibility of
higher-order opponent-modelling, i.e., to have an explicit belief about what other players can
see and how they evaluate it, a belief about what other players believe other players can
see and how they evaluate and so forth, compatibly with players’ sight. We study a solution
concept for these games and relate it to known ones from the literature.
3.1 Players’ sights and belief chains
Let us introduce the idea behind higher-order opponent modelling in MTGs using an example.
We will then move on to define the notions formally.
Example 2 (An intuitive solution) Consider the game shown in Figure 1. Three players,
Ann, Bob and Charles, move at histories marked A, B and C, respectively. The circle
surrounding history A indicates what Ann believes she can see from history A, which we write
b(A). This, intuitively, coincides what Ann can actually see, i.e., it equals s(A), Ann’s sight
at history A. What should Ann do in this situation? This depends on what Ann believes will
happen next. If Ann knew this, her choice would only be a maximization problem: finding the
action that, given what will happen in the future, gets her the maximal outcome, according to
her evaluation from A - which we write %AAnn. To find out what Charles will do, Ann considers
her belief about what Charles can see from C, which we indicate with b(A)b(C). Note this
may have nothing to do with what Charles actually sees from C, i.e., b(C). In Figure 1, for
instance, Ann believes that Charles can only see d from C. The question of what Charles will
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Figure 1: A belief structure (modulo evaluations)
do is then easily answered, even without considering his preference relation %ACAnn, what Ann
believes Charles wants from history C. Charles, according to Ann, will certainly go to d. The
next question is: what will Bob do? This, again, will depend on b(A)b(B), the portion of
Ann’s sight that Ann believes Bob can see from B and on %ABAnn, the preferences Ann believes
Bob has at B. But, at least according to Ann, Bob can also see that Charles can make moves.
So, for Bob to decide what to do, he must first find out what Charles will do - b(A)b(B)b(C)
- according to %ABCAnn . This is also an easy task, since e is the only option. The choice at
b(A)b(B)b(C) is then determined, but so is then the choice at b(A)b(B). Now all that is left
for Ann to do is to solve her maximization problem, determining the choice at b(A).
Now we concentrate on turning the intuitions in the example into formal definitions. To
do so, we introduce the notion of history-sequence. A history-sequence is a formal device that
allows to represent higher-order beliefs about other opponents, consistently with a players’
sight.
Definition 3 (History-Sequences) Consider a MTG S = (((N,H, t,Σi, o), {ui}i∈N ), s, s∗).
A history-sequence q of S is a sequence of histories of the form (h0, h1, h2, · · · , hk) such that
• hj ∈ Hdh0 for every j ∈ {1, 2, · · · k}, i.e., histories following h0 in the sequence are
histories within the sight of the player moving at h0;
• hj hj+1 for each j with 0 ≤ j < k, i.e., each history is a strict postfix of the ones with
lower index;
The underlying idea behind this definition is to consider the higher-order point of view
of the player moving at h0. Expressions of the form (h0, h1, h2, · · · , hk) encode the belief
that player moving at h0 holds about the belief that player moving at h1 holds about the
belief that player moving at h2 holds . . . about what the player moving at hk can see and
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what the evaluation is of the corresponding terminal histories. We use Q to denote the set of
history-sequences of S.
Building upon the notion of history-sequence, we can define what we call sight-compatible
belief structures, associating each history-sequence with a set of histories and an evaluation
over the terminal ones in this set.
Definition 4 (Sight-compatible belief structures) Let S be a MTG. A sight-compatible belief
structure B for S is a tuple (BH ,BP ) such that BH is a function BH : Q→ 2H , associating
to each history-sequence (h0, h1, h2, · · · , hk) a set of histories in s(h0) extending hk, and BP
is a function BP : Q → 2Z associating to each history-sequence q a set of terminal histories
extending histories in BH(q). B satisfies the following conditions:
• (Corr) ∀q ∈ Q with q = (h0), then BH(q) = Hdh0 whenever t(hk) the belief of a player
about what he himself can see is correct. 3
• (Mon of BH) ∀ q, q′ ∈ Q, if ∃h′ ∈ BH(q) s.t., q′ = (q, h′), then BH(q′) ⊆ BH(q)|h′ ,
i.e., if a player believes someone is able to perceive a portion of the game, then he is
able to perceive that portion himself.
• (Mon of BP ) ∀ q, q′ ∈ Q, if ∃h′ ∈ BH(q) s.t., q′ = (q, h′), then BP (q′) ⊆ BP (q)|h′ ,
i.e., if a player believes someone is able to explore a position, then he is able to perceive
that exploration himself.
For q = (h0, h1, h2, · · · , hk), BP (q) denotes the higher-order beliefs (in the order given
by q) about how player moving at hk is evaluating the terminal histories in BH(q) under the
unique forked extension of s whose terminal histories are BP (q). BP (q)i denotes the induced
preference relation, one per player.
The conditions above, we argue, are most natural constraints on sight-compatible higher-
order beliefs. For the time being we do not commit ourselves to any other constraints on either
BP or BH , but we acknowledge that different contexts may warrant further constraints on
both.
Definition 5 (Epistemic Monte-Carlo Tree Games) An Epistemic Monte-Carlo Tree
Games (EMTGs) is a tuple S = (S,B) where S is a MTG and B a sight-compatible belief
structure for S.
An EMTG is obtained by assigning a sight-compatible belief structure to a MTG.
One should observe how sight-compatible belief structures induce, at each history, a whole
collection of extensive games, one for each possible history-sequence. For instance, the one
resulting from Ann’s sight and her evaluation, the one resulting from Ann’s belief about Bob’s
sight and his evaluation and so forth. Structures of the form SdB(q) can now be naturally
defined, as restrictions induced by B(q) on S, adopting BH(q) as sight-restriction, and BP (q)
as evaluation function, with the induced preference relation.
3One might want to impose stronger variants of correctness. For instance the fact that if a player can see
he will be moving again, then he will consider at least as much as he is considering now, from that history on:
∀q ∈ Q, if q = (h0, h1, . . . , hk), q′ = (h1, . . . , hk) and t(h0) = t(h1) then BH(q′) = BH(q)|h0 .
We can also impose that this fact is common knowledge among the players: ∀q ∈ Q, if q =
(h0, h1, hi−1, hi, hi+1 . . . , hk), q′ = (h0, h1, hi−1, hi+1 . . . , hk) and t(hi) = t(hi−1) then BH(q′) = BH(q)|hi .
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3.2 Analysing EMTGs
Example 2 has illustrated a natural notion of solution in an epistemic MTG, where each
player calculates a best action in his or her sight restriction according to his or her evaluation
criteria, recursively computing both the sight and the evaluation criteria of the other players.
This is the idea behind the solution concept we propose for EMTGs.
Definition 6 (Nested Beliefs Solution) Let S = (S,B) be an EMTG and let q =
(h0, h1, · · · , hk) be a history-sequence. A strategy profile σdB(q) is a Nested Beliefs Solution
(NBS) of SdB(q) if:
Base step For each h′ ∈ HdBH(q) that is a quasi-terminal history of HdBH(q), we have that
h′σdBH(q,h′)(h′) BP (q,h
′)
t(h′) h
′, σ′dBH(q,h′)(h′) for any σ′dBH(q,h′) that agrees with σdB(q)
up to h′.
Induction step For each h′ ∈ HdBH(q) that is neither terminal nor quasi-terminal in
HdBH(q), we have that
• σdB(q)(h′) agrees at h′ with some Nested Beliefs Solution of SdB(q,h′).
• If, for each h′ ∈ HdBH(q) that is neither terminal nor quasi-terminal in HdBH(q),
we have that σ′dB(q)(h′) agrees at h′ with some Nested Beliefs Solution of SdB(q,h′)
then the outcome z′ generated by σ′dB(q) following h and the outcome z generated
by σdB(q) following h are such that z BP (q)t(hk) z′.
We denote NBS(SdB(q)) the set of NBS outcomes of (S,q). The composition of such
outcomes yields our game solution.
Intuitively, a Nested Beliefs Solution of some game SdB(q) is a best response to all Nested
Belief Solutions at deeper level, e.g., of each SdB(q,h′). Notice that because of the properties
of sight functions the depth iteration is bound to reach a fixpoint.
Example 7 Let’s go back to Figure 1 and compute the NBS at history A. We know there
are four relevant histories sequences: (A), (A,C), (A,B) (A,B,C). To each of them we can
associate the corresponding beliefs, as follows:
• HdBH(A)= {g, d, e, f, C,B,A} = Hdh0
• HdBH(A,B)= {e, C, f}
• HdBH(A,C)= {d}
• HdBH(A,B,C)= {e}
Let us know, for each histories sequence q specify the preference relation BP (q)tk (modulo
reflexivity and transitivity), which is all we need to compute NBS.
• BP (A)Ann = {(d, g), (g, e), (e, f), (f, e)}
• BP (A,B)Bob = {(e, f), (f, d)}
• BP (A,C)Charles = {}
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• BP (A,B,C)Charles = {}
Consider now the following strategy σdB(A) 4
• σdB(A)(A)Ann = g
• σdB(A)(B)Bob = C
• σdB(A)(C)Charles = d
Is σ a Nested Beliefs Solution of SdB(A)?
The condition at the base step is met by σdB(A)(C)Charles = d.
Lets now look at σdB(A)(B)Bob = C. Is C compatible with the best Nested Beliefs Solution
of SdB(A,B)? We need first to compute all NBS of SdB(A,B). Luckily there are not so many.
Every such strategy must be of the form σ′dB(A,B)(C)Charles = e and be the best among the
strategies agreeing with NBS of SdB(A,B,C) at C. So, given the preferences of B, be such that
σ′dB(A,B)(B)Bob = C. This is indeed what σ does.
However notice that given the preference of A, σ is not behaving as a NBS at A, because
Ann prefers d to g.
The strategy σ∗dB(A) only disagreeing with σdB(A) at (A), and being such that σdB(A)(A)Ann =
B, is a NBS of SdB(A).
The composition of Nested Beliefs Solutions constitutes a rational outcome of the game.
Definition 8 (Sight-Compatible Epistemic Solution) Let S = (S,B) be an EMTG. A
strategy profile σ is a Sight-Compatible Epistemic Solution (SCES) if at each h ∈ H \ Z,
there exists a terminal history z ∈ ZdBH(h) such that hσ(h) z and z ∈ NBS(SdB(h)).
We denote SCES the set of Sight-Compatible Epistemic Solutions of S.
A SCES is the composition of best moves of players at each history. Each such move
is a best response to what the current player believes other players will do and this belief
is supported by all higher-order beliefs, compatible with the player’s sight, about what the
opponents can perceive and how they will evaluate it.
3.2.1 Computing rational solutions
Algorithm Sol(S) below takes as input an EMTG and returns a path obtained by composing
locally rational moves, compatible with players’ higher-order beliefs about sights and
evaluation criteria of their opponents. Algorithms 1 calls Algorithm 2, which in turn calls
Algorithms 3 and 4. For technical convenience, we define VLP to be a dummy always
dominated history.
The following theorem shows that every EMTG has a Sight-Compatible Epistemic
Solution. Its proof consists in constructively building the desired strategy profile.
Theorem 9 (Existence Theorem) Let S = (S,B) be an EMTG. There exists a strategy
profile σ that is a Sight-Compatible Epistemic Solution for S = (S,B).
4Slightly abusing notation, but unambiguosly, we identify actions chosen by the strategy with the resulting
histories.
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Algorithm 1: Solution of S
1 Sol(S)
Input: An EMTG S = (S,B)
Output: A terminal history h of S
2 begin
3 h← ε;
4 while h /∈ Z do
5 h← (h,BSBI(S, h)); /* NBS at h */
6 Return h;
Algorithm 2: The current best move
1 BSBI(S, h)
Input: A game S = (S,B), and a history h
Output: NBS move a at h
2 begin
3 for each h′ ∈ BH(h) and h′ 6= h do
4 Continuations[h′]← NBS(S, (h, h′)); /* Store NBS actions in an array, one for
each h′ */
5 Return BB(S, (h), Continuations);
Proof Sketch: Let H be the set of histories in S. For every h ∈ H set σ(h) := a for ah∗ and
h∗ be the outcome returned by Algorithm 1 on input SdB(h). That the Algorithm returns a
profile o(σ) such that σ satisfies the conditions of Definition 6 at each history is a lengthy but
relatively straightforward check, which we omit for space reasons. 2
Theorem 10 (Completeness Theorem) Let S = (S,B) be a finite EMTG and let σ be a
Sight-Compatible Epistemic Solution for S = (S,B). There exists an execution of Algorithm
1 returning o(σ).
Proof Sketch: Let S = (S,B) be a finite EMTG and let σ be a Sight-Compatible Epistemic
Solution for S = (S,B). Now choose an execution of Algorithm 1 that is compatible with the
action selection that, at each history sequence, is made by σ, which exists by construction.
The finiteness assumption ensures termination. 2
The following observations illustrate the relation between SCES and the other two relevant
solution concepts in the literature: SCBI (Grossi and Turrini, 2012) and classical BI (Osborne
and Rubinstein, 1994). They specify precise conditions under which our solution concept
collapses into these two.
Proposition 11 Let S = (S,B) be an EMTG. If for any history-sequence q = (h0, h1, · · · , hk)
and any history h′ ∈ BH(q), BH(q, h′) = BH(q)|h′, and BP (q) = BP (h0), then
SCES(S)=SCBI(S).
So, if the current player believes the following players’ sights and evaluation criteria,
together with their beliefs about other players’ sights and evaluation criteria, are coherent
with his’, then SCES is equivalent to SCBI.
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Algorithm 3: Beliefs of moves of following players
1 NBS(S,q)
Input: A game S = (S,B), and a history sequence q = (h0, h1, h2, · · · , hk)
Output: An action a following hk
2 begin
3 if hk ∈ ZdBH(q) then
4 Return ε;
5 else
6 for each hk+1 ∈ BH(q) and hk+1 6= hk do
7 Continuations[hk+1]← NBS(S, (q, hk+1)); /* Store NBS actions in an array,
one for each hk+1 */
8 Return BB(S,q, Continuations);
We know that the solution concept BI is a special case of SCBI, and therefore also of
SCES.
Proposition 12 Let S = (S,B) be an EMTG. If, for any history-sequence q = (h0, h1, · · · , hk),
we have that BH(q) = H|hk and that BP (q) = Pt(hk) then SCES(S)=BI(S).
The above result says that SCES coincides with standard backwards induction solution
if, at each history, we have that higher-order beliefs about sight and evaluation criteria are
coherent with the real subgame the current player faces and the preference relation the current
player holds.
Despite the crucial presence of higher-order beliefs about sight-restricted games, we can
show the following fairly surprising complexity result.
Proposition 13 Given a finite EMTG S, the problem of computing a SCES of S is P-TIME
complete.
Proof sketch: For the upper bound, the key fact is that algorithm Sol(S) runs in time
O((n logn)2), with n being the cardinality of the set of histories of S. This follows from the
equations and facts below, where b and d are the largest number of branches and the depth
of game tree respectively: 1). T (sol(S)) = O(T (BSBI ∗ d)); 2). T (NBS) = O(T (BSBI)); 3).
T (BB) = O(b ∗ d); 4). Let f(d)=T (BSBI), then f(d)=O(b ∗ f(d− 1) + b2 ∗ f(d− 2) + b3 ∗
f(d− 3) + · · ·+ bd−1f(1) +T (BB))=O(d ∗ 2d ∗ bd); 5). d ≤ log(n) and 2d ≤ bd ≤ n. P-TIME
hardness is a consequence of (Szymanik, 2013, Theorem 2), which shows that BI is P-TIME
hard, and Proposition 12.
As a side remark, using a similar argument and Proposition 12 we are able to show that
computing SCBI solutions is P-TIME complete.
4 Conclusions and potential developments
We have proposed a model for decision-making among resource-bounded players in extensive
games, integrating an analytical perspective coming game theory with a procedural perspec-
tive coming from AI. In particular we have studied players with limited foresight which can
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Algorithm 4: Best Branch
1 BB(S,q, Continuations) /* Compose chosen moves (in array Continuations), thus get all
paths following hk and choose a best move following hk */
Input: A game S, a history sequence q, an array Continuations
Output: A best move following hk determined by Continuations
2 begin
3 bestpath← VLP; /* VLP is a dominated history for all players */
4 for each (hk, a) ∈ BH(q) do /* a is any action following hk, next we choose an
optimal one in BH(q) */
5 TP← (hk, a);
6 while Continuations[TP] is defined in array Continuations do
7 TP← (TP,Continuations[TP]);
8 if TP BP (q)t(hk) bestpath then
9 bestpath← TP;
10 bestmove← a;
11 Return bestmove;
reason about their opponents, constructing beliefs about their limited abilities for calculation
and evaluation, showing that our novel games have a well-behaved solution, generalising
existing ones in the literature.
There are interesting modelling issues, as noted previously. Our game models strike a
balance between simple trees as used for BI and more complex models as found in epistemic
game theory (Perea, 2012). Here, what we left open is the relation between EMTGs and
the Extensive Games with Awareness of (Halpern and Rêgo, 2006). We expect that the
correspondence for GSSs of Theorem 3 in (Grossi and Turrini, 2012) can be lifted to EMTGs,
using an iteration of the awareness functions Awi for players i to simulate the believed game
at a history sequence. We stress, though, that the specific features of EMTGs give them
an independent conceptual and technical interest. The emphasis on limited foresight (as
opposed to perceiving a novel extensive game in (Halpern and Rêgo, 2006)) makes them a
natural candidate for addressing Rubinstein’s modelling challenge (Rubinstein, 2004), while
still supporting an efficient algorithm to calculate the game equilibria.
Finally, our analysis raises several issues of logical definability and styles of reasoning. We
believe that our solution concept is still definable in a computationally well-behaved logical
language, a natural candidate being the fixed-point logic FOL(FP), shown in (van Benthem
and Gheerbrant, 2010) to express backwards induction. What is new in our setting is that
the reasoning underpinning our main theorems is a mixture of a backward induction style
with a forward induction style (Perea, 2012; van Benthem, 2014), since we have to evaluate
what players further down in the game tree are going to do according to players whose moves
occurred earlier on in the game.
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